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thoughtful monist position of Nancey Murphy (Whatever Happened to the Soul,
1998). Whereas Murphy considers her nonreductive physicalism as part of a
scientific research program, the authors object that "this approach to the
mind-body problem seems to be an expression of the low epistemic value
usually attributed to theology by advocates of the complementarity
approach" (168). For them, the weight of evidence clearly rests on theology
and philosophy, and not science; "science provides little evidence at all for
settling the issue" (170). Furthermore, where science is introduced in the
book, it is basic and at times inaccurate. For example, biologists deservedly
would be perplexed when informed that reproduction and growth "cannot
be acc01mted for solely by the laws of chemistry and physics" (80). Or consider the authors' contention "that DNA needs a driver." Quoting a noted
French geneticist Francois Jacob that "'able to function only within the cell,
the genetic message can do nothing by itself,'" they conclude that "he is
describing something like a substance in which the DNA is an important part
that needs instructions from some other part of the organism," which "leaves
the door open for consideration of ... the soul" (296-7). Not only does this
discussion of a driver for DNA mistake cause for context, but it confuses the
very elements the authors have been at pains to distinguish elsewhere, i.e.,
the scientific and the metaphysical, for here they posit a metaphysical entity
to perform biological tasks such as gene expression and determining how
"'the cell senses danger and instigates responses to it'" (quoting geneticist
Barbara McClintock). As my geneticist colleague commented, McClintock
would rise out of her grave on hearing such an interpretation of her contention that DNA needs a context in which to function. The welcome attempt
to avoid genetic reductionism leads to serious misrepresentation of genetics
and a type of philosophical soul-of-the-gaps. As a philosopher, I would be
the last (well, almost) to denigrate the value of philosophy. But at the same
time, philosophy must take account of the empirical. Science has greatly
advanced our understanding not only of the human body with its brain, but
of the human person expressed in its many features. We fail to integrate science with our theology and philosophy at significant peril.

Persons & Causes, by Timothy O'Connor. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000. Pp. xv, 125 plus References and Index. $35.00 (hardcover)
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College
Timothy O'Connor is one of the leading contemporary advocates of a libertarian view of freedom (free will or agency theory) that incorporates the
concept of agent causation, and Persons & Causes is a first-rate presentation
of this kind of libertarianism. It contains a defense of a version of a modal
argument for incompatibilism (Chapter 1) and an examination of the agent
causationist views of Thomas Reid, Richard Taylor, and Roderick Chisholm
(Chapter 3). The principal aim of Persons ['1' Causes, however, is to explain
why an adequate libertarianism must include agent causation. The main
opponents of O'Connor are either (1) libertarians who affirm that agent cau-
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sation is necessary for a viable libertarianism but who disagree with
O'Connor's view that reasons are not causes (deterministic or indeterministic) of choices (decisions); (2) libertarians who deny agent causation and
who believe that reasons are indeterministic causes of choices; or (3) libertarians who agree with O'Connor that reasons are not causes of choices but
who believe that agent causation is superfluous for an adequate account of
libertarian freedom. Because this reviewer is a proponent of the third kind
of view (call it "noncausal libertarianism") and a target of some of
O'Connor's comments in Persons & Causes, the substance of this review will
be concerned with whether O'Connor has succeeded in showing that agent
causation is necessary for an adequate libertarian account of freedom.
According to O'Connor (Chapter 6), the central concept in agency theory is a macro-level agent-causal active power (active power, for short) that
arises out of (emerges from) and is causally sustained by microphysical
properties of a human being that is itself a natural object. When an agent
exercises his active power (when he is an agent cause), he causally produces effects in the physical world (top-down causation). When and how
an agent exercises his active power is freely determined by him (xiv). An
exercise of active power immediately produces an-action-triggering-intention-to-so-act-here-and-now-to-satisfy-a-desire, where the coming-to-be of
an action-triggering intention to act is itself an internal, causally structureless (simple) mental event. The mental act of choosing (making a decision)
is a complex state of affairs that consists of the agent causation (exercise of
active power) of the coming-to-be of an action-triggering intention (72, f.n.
11). Elsewhere,' O'Com10r makes clear that in a causal relationship consisting of an agent's causing of the coming-to-be on an intention, "there is
no causally simple component event forming its [the causal relationship's]
initial segment. N2 With agent causation, "there is no event at its [the causal
relationship's] front end, ... but only an enduring agent."3
O'Connor believes that there are two reasons why agent causation is
required for an adequate account of libertarian freedom. First, an agent
must determine or control his free action, and in order to do this he must
control the coming-to-be of the action-triggering intention (it is the initial
event-part of a free action). The agent controls the coming-to-be of the
action-triggering intention by causally producing it through an exercise of
active power, where the exercise of active power (agent causation) is itself
essentially uncaused (81, f.n. 25). In contrast to O'COlmor's view, a noncausal libertarianism of the type that this reviewer defends maintains that
an agent has the ontologically basic power to choose. An exercising of the
power to choose-a choice-is an internally causally structureless event
that is essentially uncaused. When an agent makes a choice, he has intrinsic (nonrelational and, thus, noncausal) control of it. O'Connor believes
that his view provides a more satisfactory account of control.
TI1e second reason for thinking that agent causation is required for an
adequate account of libertarian freedom arises from Donald Davidson's
challenge to anyone who claims that reasons are not causes of actions.
Davidson notes that it is possible for an agent to have a reason to act and
perform that act, and yet that reason not be the reason that explains his
action because he performed that action for a different reason that he also
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had for performing it. In a situation where an agent has two reasons to
perform the same action, it is possible to account for the distinction
beh'Veen the reason that explains that action and the reason that does not
but accompanies its performance, only if the reason that explains it causes
it. O'Connor believes that an adequate libertarian response to Davidson
requires the inclusion of agent causation. While reasons are not causes of
free actions, exercisings of active agent-causal power are. (O'Connor maintains that reasons are structuring causes of action in the sense that they are
tendency-conferring states that provide alternative paths for an agent to
pursue, but they do not cause free actions in the sense of generating, producing, or triggering the coming-to-be of intentions to act (95-101 )). An
agent's exercise of active causal power "provides a necessary link between
reason and behavior, without which the reason could not in any significant
way explain the behavior." (88) Equipped with the notion of the exercise
of active power, the agent causationist can say that the reason explaining
an agent's free action is the one referred to in the intention that is caused by
the agent's exercise of active power. Because the coming-to-be of an intention is the coming-to-be of an intention to act to satisfy or fulfill a particular
desire (reason), the link between the free action and the reason that
explains it is forged by the agent's exercise of active power that produces
an intention that refers to that reason (85-91). "[R]easons and agent-causal
initiation are each necessary to the agency theorist's explanatory scheme."
(88) Thus, while neither O'Connor nor the noncausal libertarian claims
that reasons are causes of free actions, O'Connor maintains that an adequate answer to Davidson's challenge requires an appeal to causation that
an agent causationist is equipped to give, but a noncausallibertarian is not.
Is agent causation required for an adequate libertarianism, or is a noncausal libertarianism sufficient? There are good reasons to think that agent
causation is thoroughly superfluous. Consider O'Conner's first reason for
believing otherwise. According to the noncausallibertarian, a choice is an
internally causally structureless simple event that is an essentially
uncaused exercising by an agent of his power to choose over which he has
intrinsic control. What is O'Connor's alternative? A choice is a complex
state of affairs that consists of an exercising of active power that causes the
coming-to-be of an intention, where it is impossible for an exercising of
power itself to be caused (it is essentially uncaused). Moreover, "exerting
active power is intrinsically a direct exercise of control" such that an
'I agency theory needn/t tell a further story that explains how the agent controls this event [the complex event of the agent's exercising his causal
power that produces the coming-to-be of an intention] itselC' (61) As
O'Connor is well aware, a tu quoque response to the agent causationist is
obvious: If the noncausallibertarian's appeal to the notion of an agent's
intrinsic control of his exercising of his power to choose is inadequate, then
the agent causationist's appeal to the concept of an agent's intrinsic control
of his exertion of active power is too (59). O'Connor's response is to say
that the notion of a choice that is the essentially uncaused exercising of the
mental power to choose is clearly inappropriate for an internal, causally
structureless occurrence that an agent intrinsically controls (59, f.n. 36). But
why is this notion so clearly inappropriate? O'Connor doesn't say and,
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therefore, one suspects that his retort is more bluff than stuff. Unless he
can say something informative, he has given no reason "to complicate our
picture of agency with the notion of agent causation" (59).
What about O'Connor's second reason for including agent causation in
agency theory?' He claims that without agent causation it is impossible for
those libertarians who believe that reasons are not causes of free action to
answer Davidson's challenge. An exercise of active power that causes the
coming-to-be of an intention provides the necessary link between a free
action of which the coming-to-be of the intention is the initial event-part
and the reason that explains that action. There is no agent-causal link
between that same action and the other reason the agent had for performing it, and this explains why the one reason explains its performance and
the other does not. At this point, however, Davidson will merely retrench
and argue as follows: Given that the exercise of active power causally
explains the coming-to-be of an intention to act, in a situation where an
agent has more than one reason for performing an action, what explains his
exercise of active power? Presumably, the agent causationist will answer
that what explains the exercise of active power is the reason for which the
agent acts. But now it seems that the agent causationist has merely relocated the alleged problem. Davidson will argue that the agent has two reasons for exercising his active power. What accounts for the fact that one of
those reasons explains the agent's exercise of his active power while the
other does not but merely accompanies it? O'Connor can't respond that
the reason that explains the exercise of active power does so iI, virtue of an
additional exercise of active power that causally links that reason with the
exercise of active power that produces the coming-to-be of the intention to
act. He can't claim this because he claims that the exercising of active
power that causes the coming-to-be of the intention to act is essentially
uncaused. Moreover, it is doubtful that O'Connor would want to claim
this because it has all the makings of a vicious infinite regress. What, then,
can he say in response to Davidson? It seems that he must say that an
agent exercises his active power for the one reason and not the other, and
the reason that explains this exercise of active power is not a cause of its
exercise. But this is precisely the answer that the noncausal libertarian
gives to Davidson: in a situation where an agent has more than one reason
for making the same choice to act, he makes the choice for one reason and
not the other, and the reason which explains that choice does not cause it. S
In short, another tu quoque response to O'Connor is appropriate: If the noncausal libertarian's answer to Davidson is inadequate, so is his.
What any libertarian must do to answer Davidson adequately is provide an account of reasons explanation that is not causal in nature. I have
argued elsewhere that the libertarian can provide such an account in terms
of teleology." Reasons are purposes for which agents choose. They are not
causes of choices. Given a teleological explanation of an essentially
uncaused exercising of the power to choose, there is "no reason to complicate our picture of agency with the notion of agent causation." (59)
Contrary to what O'Connor argues in his excellent book Persons & Causes,
agent causation is thoroughly superfluous to agency theory?
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1. Timothy O'Connor, "Agent Causation," in Agents, Causes E-f Events, ed.
by Timothy O'Connor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 186.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. What follows in this paragraph is a shortened version of a critique of
O'Connor's view that I presented in "Failed Solutions to a Standard Libertarian
Problem," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998): 237-244.
5. See my "A Noncausal Theory of Agency," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 49 (1988): 303-316; and "Libertarian Choice," Faith
and Philosophy 14 (1997): 195-211.
6. See the papers referred to in endnote 5.
7. I want to thank Andrei Buckareff and William Hasker for reading this
review and making helpful comments.

Augustine's Invention of the inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist. By
Phillip Cary. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xviii + 214. $45
(cloth).
PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, University of Illinois at Chicago
This book is an essay in intellectual history, an enterprise that its author
understands, largely following Alasdair MacIntyre, as an attempt to trace
the trajectory of a tradition through time. Such trajectories, Cary thinks, are
produced by the handing on of intellectual materials (texts, concepts,
modes of argument, epistemological and ontological commitments) from
one generation to the next, and by the attempt of those whose thought
moves within the bounds of some tradition or other to deal with the problems raised by that tradition for itself, and those produced for it by its
interaction with what is alien to it.
Cary deals in this book with a particular episode in the history of the
tradition of Christian thought, so understood. It is, as he presents it, a dramatic episode, one in which the inner self is for the first time explicitly presented as a space in which explorations can be undertaken and discoveries
made, a space the exploration of which is essential for the closer and fuller
understanding of God. This is what Cary calls the "invention" of the inner
self. In so calling it he plays upon the range of meanings to be found in the
Latin invenire: finding, discovery, creation, construction. The poet 'invents'
his tropes and images; the rhetor preparing a speech 'invents' his periods
and 'discovers' his authorities; and the philosopher faced with a difficulty
'finds' his concepts and 'constructs' his arguments-all this is suggested by
inverT ire, and by using the term Cary does not mean to suggest that the
'invention' of the idea that the self is timer space should be understood in
such a way as to deny that the self's inner space was also discovered
(found) by Augustine. Cary does in fact thti1k that Augustine's invention
was an unfortunate one from a Christian point of view; but his goal in the
book is neither to defend nor to explain any such view, but rather to show

